General – the Netherlands
Gasunie subsidiary GTS has published a resilience analysis that assesses the robustness of the European and Dutch gas systems in the face of prolonged gas supply disruptions.
The analysis shows that additional measures are needed to be able to cover potential gas shortages caused by a months-long gas supply disruption.
From its independent advisory role to the Dutch Minister for Climate and Green Growth on gas supply security, GTS believes that the Netherlands is well prepared for common supply security situations, such as exceptionally cold winters and short-term infrastructure outages.
However, the Netherlands and Europe as a whole are insufficiently prepared for a prolonged and large-scale gas supply interruption.
Crucial measures required to get through prolonged interruptions are to keep existing gas storage facilities operational and build up strategic emergency gas reserves.
GTS recommends examining how much of the so-called ‘cushion gas’ can be used as part of the strategic emergency gas reserves, to have a strategic emergency reserve of sufficient size in place by the start of the 2026–2027 winter.
Without these precautionary measures, the Netherlands will be insufficiently resilient against prolonged geopolitical disruptions, sabotage and international supply issues.
Changing geopolitical climate
Like in the rest of Europe, gas supply in the Netherlands has seen drastic changes over the past few years. Where the Netherlands used to be a net exporter of gas, we now depend on imports for roughly 67% of the gas we consume. The foreign gas comes partly from Norway and is increasingly imported in liquefied form from countries like the United States.
At the same time, natural gas will continue to be crucial to the energy supply over the coming decades as an affordable energy source for industry and households. Gas also plays a key role for power stations to cover fluctuations in the supply of solar and wind power. As a result, the strategic importance of security of supply is increasing rather than decreasing.
The combination of high dependence on imports, geopolitical tensions, and an energy system in transition adds to the vulnerability of the Netherlands. According to GTS, a prolonged months-long disruption may lead to extreme price rises, major economic impact, and escalating energy poverty, comparable to the impact of the European gas crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
“The current geopolitical climate requires us to be realistic and prepared for the unexpected in the longer term,” says Gasunie Executive Board member Hans Coenen. “In the resilience analysis, GTS lays out a clear picture of where the bottlenecks are for gas supply security, while also presenting measures that are urgently needed to boost the gas system’s long-term resilience and reduce the risk of economic impact and forced disconnection of industry. This analysis gives our government specific guidance to inform its decisions.”
Domestic strategic gas reserves as the key to resilience
The Netherlands has four major gas storage facilities in former gas fields, which can be used to build up strategic gas reserves for emergencies. These gas storage facilities jointly hold 137 TWh of working gas and approximately 300 TWh of cushion gas.
Over the coming year, around 115 TWh of the working gas will be needed to cover common gas supply security situations. According to GTS, the remaining gas, along with part of the cushion gas, can be used as strategic emergency reserves in order to bridge a prolonged gas supply interruption.
Cushion gas is a large amount of natural gas that is kept in a storage facility to maintain adequate pressure to be able to extract the working gas. In exceptional emergencies, some of this gas can be used to mitigate shortages. GTS recommends further examining whether cushion gas could be used more widely. The Netherlands has around 300 TWh in cushion gas, and there is at least 800 TWh of it across Europe.
Although technically feasible, GTS is not planning for a situation where the Groningen gas field is kept open as a strategic gas reserve, given the current political reality and the fact that existing legislation would not allow it.
Hans Coenen: “Gas supply security hinges on building a strategic emergency reserve. The existing gas storage facilities give the Netherlands exceptional potential to build up strategic emergency gas reserves. By filling storage facilities to a higher level and using cushion gas as a last resort, we can mitigate prolonged shortages and prevent price peaks.”
European approach
A prolonged gas supply disruption is a Europe-wide risk rather than just a domestic Dutch problem. GTS stresses that EU Member States must assess the risks together and jointly decide whether and how to organise emergency gas reserves.
According to GTS, the revision of EU rules on gas supply security offers an ideal opportunity to make clear agreements on this. They will have to specifically allow for strategic emergency gas reserves to be used in the event of an imminent or actual prolonged gas supply disruption, both to protect households and to keep industry running.
